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RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND LUCK
Jaime Malamud Goti*
I.
To state that some outcome you bring about is luck's work is to deny you are
either responsible or commendable for its occurrence. Control or luck; this is how
most regard the alternative in every field. If I tell you it was by pure luck that you
made a great discovery, that you won the tennis match, or that the salmon you
broiled tastes so good, I mean you have no right to gloat over your performance as
a scientist, as a tennis player, or as a chef. This language reflects the notion that
luck excludes praise and responsibility because desert-good and bad-is
grounded in the control of our will over events. Thus, under this standard view, it
makes no sense to either praise or blame you for what happens beyond your
control. I set out to dispute the validity of this belief.
Philosophers and theologians debate what in our lives is apportionable to
responsibility or luck. Some maintain we are not responsible for anything,
including what we suppose we deliberately do with our bodies. Fatalists believe
that all the things occurring in the world have been set into motion-and
steered-by some external force or hand. For them, our will is impotent to alter
the course of events whether or not they should course through our body.' The
universe is run by fate, such that no occurrence in our life is of our own doing.
There are also those who support the opposite view, such as J.L. Borges's
character, Otto Dietrich zur Linde, who reminds us of the metaphysical belief that
each one of us has prefigured every single thing that takes place in our lives,
including those that we mistakenly suppose happen to our lives.' In allusion to
this conception, Borges writes in Deutsches Requiem:
[A]ll things that can occur to a man, from the moment of his birth to the moment of
his death, have been predetermined by him. Thus, all inadvertence is deliberate,
* Universidad de San Andres, Buenos Aires; Former Solicitor to the Argentinean Supreme
Court. I am very thankful to Carlos Rosenkrantz for patiently discussing this paper with me, to the
student editors of Tulsa Law Review for their able editorial assistance, and especially to editors Preston
Hanner and Brian McKay for their remarkable assistance.
1. See Bernard Williams, How Free Does the Will Need to Be?, in Making Sense of Humanity and
Other Philosophical Papers, 1982-1993, at 3, 11 (Cambridge U. Press 1995).
2. Jorge Luis Borges, Deutsches Requiem, in Collected Fictions 229, 231 (Andrew Hurley trans.,
Viking 1998).
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every casual encounter is an engagement made beforehand, every humiliation is an
act of penitence, every failure a mysterious victory, every death a suicide.3
Most of us hold a less radical stand that allows room for both responsibility and
luck. We believe we are responsible for some events under our control, but not
for others that we attribute to happenstance. As he does with every central aspect
of criminal responsibility, George Fletcher lays out an interesting view on luck and
responsibility.
4.In Rethinking Criminal Law, in my opinion the most creative work on
criminal responsibility of its time, Fletcher maintains that the harm we cause is
morally relevant, and therefore warrants harsher penalties than harmless
attempts. We are-or may reasonably be held-more responsible if we bring
about harm than if we just set out to cause it but end up failing. Outcomes
increase our responsibility even if these outcomes are beyond our control.
Fletcher writes:
[I]t would be plausible to argue that attempts at the early stages should be punished
less severely than attempts in which the actor has done everything in his power to
bring about the harm. But the act in this latter category of last-step attempts is the
same as the act that produces the harmful consequence. The only difference is that
a causal process beyond the actor's control sometimes generates harm and
sometimes not. The problem is explaining why this factor of chance, extrinsic to the
wrongful act, should influence the gravity of the wrong and the level of punishment.
5
To establish the moral relevance of harm, Fletcher couches his position in
emotivist terms. Thus, we ought not treat others in ways we would resent to be
treated ourselves. Thus, we ought not punish an agent as if he had in fact caused
harm that did not happen.6 To place ourselves in some other person's place is a
well-seated method for testing the objective validity of moral claims. If it is not
good or right in my case that I am treated so, then it is not good or right that I
should treat you that way. In essence, I agree with Fletcher's view on the
relevance of outcomes with the caveat that the procedure he has chosen to
validate his view renders the appeal to the emotions superfluous. My thesis draws
on the practice of blame and holds that emotions play an essential background
role.7 I first distinguish between events that fall within and beyond our control at
two different levels: First, I tackle the issue of luck at the level of common social
beliefs and practices. Second, I broach the same issue at a philosophical or
conceptual level, one of (more) rigorous reflection upon what we actually do
3. Id.
4. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
5. Id. at 474.
6. Id. at 482-83.
7. See Stephen P. Garvey, The Moral Emotions of the Criminal Law, 22 QLR 145 (2003). In
supporting the difference thesis, Professor Garvey's view is that emotions play out in a different
manner when we cause harms than when we don't. On this basis, Garvey distinguishes between
different kinds of guilt and between guilt and responsibility. Based on my own intuition, I agree with
his distinctions but doubt that they should hold independently from another, stronger intuition. The
latter refers to succeeding and failing to cause harm. My sense is that that falling back on intuitions
about guilt and shame may mean hitching the cart before the horse.
[Vol. 39:861
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control beyond experience. I then lay out the reasons that turn blame into a
practice essential to our social interaction. Finally, I explain the reasons why
blame should be grounded in control in the first, common social practice approach
to the distinction between control and luck.
I refer to "doing" and "actions" as just basic bodily movements and exclude
causal processes beyond the agent's body. By luck, I rather loosely mean
whatever happens in-and to-our life beyond our control. I take on after
Thomas Nagel's well known article Moral Luck 8 to distinguish three kinds of luck:
constitutive luck, situational luck, and outcome luck.9 The first, constitutive luck,
consists in the kind of persons we are: our physical makeup, innate tastes, talents,
and inclinations. We had no say on whether we would be affectionate and
sensitive or taller than six feet. Situational luck consists in the circumstances in
which our life develops beyond our will. Some people sail through a safe and
undisturbed existence while others are forced to face crucial situations on a daily
basis. Some of us are born into harmonious and ordered families and
communities, whereas others are raised in poverty and violent neighborhoods or
trapped in a merciless war. Finally, outcome luck lies with how our projects work
out; with what transpires in the world once we willfully move our bodies. In
establishing responsibility, moral and criminal law theorists are usually sensitive to
facts that fall within the first two categories. Tragic choices impinge on our
autonomy and, consequently, on our responsibility too. I later show there are
connections between the moral assessment of our actions and these three kinds of
luck.
The central topic of this paper is outcome luck. What happens after we do
what we believe can further a certain goal is a matter of luck. I may have missed
the shot that decided the archery contest because a hare sprang between my arrow
and the target. Unlike your victim, mine survived because the ambulance driver
knew every shortcut in town and the surgeon was the best in town. Outcome luck
is particularly controversial among moral and criminal law theorists, and this may
be because it tackles two contradictory intuitions: first, that only control warrants
reproach and, second, that what happens in the world outside us matters. Some
scholars espouse the view I call the irrelevance thesis. They claim that the
outcomes of what we do should not affect the extent of our moral responsibility.
Strictly speaking, causing damage and pain are beyond our control and should not
affect the agent's responsibility. That you wore a bulletproof vest when I fired the
gun trained on your chest is beyond my intent and control. I am not sure what a
champion of this thesis would say about achievements that we praise, but they
prove to be unwavering when it comes to moral and criminal condemnation. They
maintain it makes no sense to hold people responsible for occurrences they cannot
avert or change. Once the perpetrator has left the poisoned water on your
bedside table, it's entirely up to you whether the murderous plan succeeds. If the
8. Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck 57 (Daniel Statman ed., S.U.N.Y. Press 1993).
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irrelevance thesis were true, not only should we reject the impact of luck in
relation to events and states of affairs it brings about in our lives, but we would
also have to make sure luck in no way seeps into our own judgments so that they
remain impervious to chance.1°
Contrary to the irrelevance thesis, the difference thesis maintains it is morally
different to try to kill a person than to actually cause this person's death. Though
immediately appealing, this thesis is difficult to support. We tend to consider our
will to be the only object of our moral judgments, and this approach makes the
irrelevance thesis trivially correct. But turning our will into the necessary and
sufficient reason for blame misplaces the question. It tackles the issue of
responsibility from the point of view of private rather than political morality. I
shall devote a good part of Part II of this paper to demonstrate why the former
approach misplaces the problem.
II.
Most criminal codes in the western culture punish criminal intent more
severely when the agent succeeds in bringing about the harm. This trend seems to
match a common perception in the western culture that the difference thesis is
morally correct. It seems clear, however, that in establishing the limits of
responsibility, ordinary moral perceptions are suspect from the outset. The real
challenge is whether we can justify this intuition by appealing to principles of
critical morality, detached from the community's beliefs.
My purpose here is modest. I do not believe criminal outcomes ought
invariably to elicit a stronger condemnation of the agent or his deed. I only
maintain that stronger condemnation is not, as defenders of the irrelevance thesis
maintain, necessarily unreasonable, let alone irrational. I thus set out to support
the difference thesis but, in searching for a view outside individual morality, I
overlook theories based on the advantage of either thesis in fitting a positive legal
order." The reason lies in that such a theory would assume that which we aim to
demonstrate: a just legal order should be shaped after the most acceptable moral
thesis.
10. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980, at 20, 21
(Cambridge U. Press 1981). Williams also maintains that morality must constitute a supreme value
system. Id. at 21-22.
11. Steven Sverdlik, for instance, claims that the irrelevance thesis is more suitable than the
difference thesis to address certain kinds of mistakes. Suppose A shoots B instead of C because either
A was mistaken about the direction of the bullet or thought B was in fact C. In either case, we find it
quite problematic to establish A's criminal responsibility under the difference theory. Similarly, we
encounter serious difficulties to adequately punish A if he shoots B with the intent to kill him but
actually kills him when, believing his victim to be dead, A throws B out the window to conceal his
crime, and B dies from the fall. In these three cases, we should convict A only of an attempt although
B winds up dead. This seductive argument is based on ordinary positive legal provisions in western
legislation and is thus unsatisfactory to answer our basic question of justifying law itself. See Steven
Sverdlik, Crime and Moral Luck, in Controversies in Criminal Law: Philosophical Essays on
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Most generally, there are two levels at which we may discuss what does and
what does not fall under the control of the agent. We may ground this notion in a
common sense approach (CSA) that considers it essential the way we ordinarily
value our actions and their consequences. Control at this level is essentially
empirical. We control what we foresee as a regular occurrence. At the second
level experience is inessential; the issue here is now conceptual in that our concern
is what, if anything, necessarily falls under our command, whatever this means. I
call the latter the philosophical approach (PA) and seek to establish what
processes are in no way subject to chance. CSA has been convincingly put
forward by R.A. Duff1 2 and also persuasively challenged by Andrew Ashworth.13
Duff maintains that if we were to accept the irrelevance thesis, all we can
predicate about what we do is that only actions remain under our control. We can
only say we try insofar as the outcomes of our actions are placed beyond this
control. It follows that the social world of moral responsibility would not be one
of achievements but only of "tryings." 14 We would not only talk about ourselves as
"trying" to steal other people's property and sell someone else's car pretending it
is our own. Because the efficacy of all actions is contingent upon circumstances
external to us, we would also only try to comb our hair and drive our car. Now
this would sound strange. Such language would not report accurately on how we
interact with others. The language of trying is applicable only when failure is
highly probable. To say I will try to comb my hair or do the laundry is either
artificial, misleading, or both. It strongly suggests, when referring to everyday
activities, there are covert reasons that may hinder our pursuit. Indeed, CSA
points to the way in which we refer to our actions and stresses that reference to
our purposes and intentions suggests we seriously doubt that the outcome will
come about. I say you have gone home to sleep if that is the reason you provide
when you leave the party. To declare that you "intend"-or "try"-to go home
and get some sleep sounds pessimistic or eccentric, or it suggests you are relatively
unfit to pull off a rather simple undertaking. That could well be Antonio, who has
just taken up driving, had several vodka shots, and is new in town. In his case, it
will be natural to refer to his effort on a journey through the city as just trying.
Reference to the agent's intent is appropriate when we underscore our serious
worry about the projected outcome.
We live in a social world in which almost everything we do belongs to the
first category, to undertakings that allow us to take success for granted.15 Thus, we
assume, as does the law in our culture, that criminals are usually successful too.
16
12. See R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts 327-47 (Clarendon Press 1996) [hereinafter Duff, Criminal
Attempts]; R.A. Duff, Subjectivism, Objectivism and Criminal Attempts, in Harm and Culpability 19
(A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., Clarendon Press 1996); R.A. Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal
Liability, in Action and Value in Criminal Law 75 (Stephen Shute, John Gardner & Jeremy Horder
eds., Clarendon Press 1993) [hereinafter Duff, Acting].
13. See Andrew Ashworth, Taking the Consequences, in Action and Value in Criminal Law 107
(Stephen Shute, John Gardner & Jeremy Horder eds., Clarendon Press 1993).
14. Duff, Acting, supra n. 12, at 85-88.
15. Id. at 90-93.
16. Duff, Criminal Attempts, supra n. 12, 284-85; Duff, Acting, supra n. 12, at 102-06.
2004]
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It is therefore natural to presuppose that in the abstract we-through criminal
provisions-condemn successful actions. We mention it expressly when we
punish more leniently unsuccessful wrongdoing, thereby signaling that we don't
condemn the action quite as strongly. But these are only exceptions to the rule
according to which we expect ourselves and others to succeed at what we set out
to do unless it is particularly complex or confronts us with special difficulties and
risks. Laid out this way, the difference thesis derives its plausibility from ordinary
beliefs grounded in experience. In our common parlance, we assume that the
agent is in control of events even after, detached from her body, the causal process
takes its own course. We still believe causal processes will work out just as the
agent thought they would. This view seems to make a lot of sense, but so does
Ashworth's critique.
17
The problem with CSA, Ashworth maintains, is that it doesn't tell us much
more than does an average member of our community." CSA originates in the
same source as our common beliefs about the good and the correct. CSA may, I
insist, be as impregnated with prejudice as our neighbor's opinion about sex out of
wedlock and polygamy in Senegal. To reach this idea about the extent and
meaning of control, we don't really need to develop a whole theory. We already
know how our opinionated neighbors would respond to our queries on whether
causing someone's death is worse than just trying to kill him. Our mission is to
filter these widely shared beliefs through articulate principles detached from those
of the community. To set the limits of moral and criminal responsibility on the
basis of ordinary moral beliefs, says Ashworth, means consecrating moral
populism., 9
Thus, it seems, we need to appeal to a bias-proof notion of luck and control:
PA. The issue now is to establish an untainted and consistent conception of
control under PA and determine how far our will is in command of what happens
around us. Indeed, we will see, very little really is. Thomas Nagel has stressed
that, strictly speaking, we can only control our mental states, not our body.20 Thus
far, according to PA, the practice of blaming for the actions we do is largely
grounded in the illusion that we can fully trust our bodies. But beyond empirical
CSA, we cannot fully trust our muscles, for they may fail to obey us when we
command them to stretch and contract. The fact that my body should move in
certain ways does not depend only on my will. It is also conditioned upon certain
biological processes that govern the relationship between mind and body. It
follows that, under PA's strict notion of control, judgments about our
responsibility cover an extremely small portion of our lives. PA, in Nagel's view,
reduces the field of moral reproach and condemnation to that of just our will.21
But I believe we are even more limited than that.
17. See Ashworth, supra n. 13, at 111.
18. See id. at 110-13.
19. See id. at 113-14.
20. Nagel, supra n. 8, at 58-59, 63.
21. Id. at 65-67.
[Vol. 39:861
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Luck also pervades our mental processes. The meaning and validity of a
great deal of our mental activity depends on other people's beliefs and attitudes
which, in turn, these individuals cannot themselves control. Let me quickly survey
two examples of this limitation on the ability to control our minds. The first is
what John Searle calls "collective intentionality. '2 2 The second lies with the
notion of interaction and a distinction on which Nagel's contention is based: the
distinction between mind and object, subjective and objective. The first case
shows that the meaning of our beliefs is dependent not only on external facts, but
also on what happens in other people's minds. The latter blurs the distinction
between subject and object. I start with the notion of collective intentionality.
By collective intentionality, I refer to that reality external to my mind, whose
existence depends not only on certain preconditions in the world of material
objects but also upon the beliefs and attitudes of other people. You are ready to
trade your book with me because you think the piece of paper I offer you is
money-and a sufficient supply of money. Unlike cats and lakes, the existence of
money is contingent, as Searle points out, on our own-and other people's-
beliefs and attitudes.23 The value of what I offer you does not depend entirely on
the existence of a certain material object nor, at least not entirely, on my own
beliefs and acts. It also hinges upon whether you-and a number of other
people-believe that it has a certain exchange value. Thus, this piece of paper
ceases to be money the moment a number of people stop treating it as such. This
applies to institutional facts too. The existence of presidents and weddings also
depends on other people's attitudes and mindsets. The same happens with objects
we define by the function we assign to them: I believe these objects are chairs,
books, and radios, but the fact is that the truth-and nature-of my belief
depends on whether or not other people concur in assigning the same purpose to
them. Beliefs and attitudes that shape my own reality are "objective" in the sense
that they take place outside my mind. But they are not objective insofar as they
are not corporeal. They are subjective in the sense that they exist only inside a
mind-your mind or theirs.
What follows is that the true value and meaning of my beliefs lie beyond my
own control and are thus, strictly viewed, contingent upon luck. The point here is
that the validity of my beliefs-and of others' beliefs-should often themselves be
included among the conditions of the validity of the same beliefs-yours and
mine-and the appropriateness of our resulting attitudes and actions. This
becomes visible with most forms of human interaction which, as we tend to think
of them, erase the strict boundaries distinguishing subjective and objective.
It is customary among anthropologists to describe the scene in which they
meet the subject of their research in terms such as the following: "I am looking at
him, looking at me, looking at him, looking at me...." This scene depicts the
researcher in the process of interviewing someone whose psychology and behavior
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she seeks to understand. In this act, the researcher is trapped in a position from
which she can only watch the subject when-and as-the subject watches her.
She is watching the subject, who is watching her. Beyond (and surely against) her
will, the researcher has somehow incorporated the subject's behavior as a part of
her own behavior. Subjective and objective no longer remain separate. The
presence and behavior of the subject are reflected in the present (and consequent)
behavior of the anthropologist, and vice versa. The researcher's behavior
becomes part of the subject's behavior. In this situation, the anthropologist
discovers-mostly to her chagrin-that she cannot elude incorporating her own
behavior into that of the research subject. As a consequence of this process, the
subject loses its epistemic "purity" or independence, and the researcher loses the
desired neutrality by having incorporated the subject's behavior into her own.
This proves to be a circular process, inherent to humans' varied and
everyday examples of interaction.24 Think of the effectiveness of voodoo curses in
some parts of the world.2 If voodoo black magic does not lie on supernatural evil
powers-as I truly hope it does not-its efficacy depends on the victim's beliefs
and also upon the beliefs of members of the victim's human environment. The
effectiveness of the voodoo witch in killing his victim depends on these people's
attitude, which usually consists of treating the targeted victim in a certain way:
first as ailing, and later as inevitably dying. This is in fact a self-fulfilling prophecy.
It is belief-and the subsequent reflection of this belief-that asserts its own
26validity. The witch's assumption that he will kill the targeted victim is neither
true nor false. It turns out to be true if-and only if-the victim and those who
27surround her believe it is true. Processes like this, it seems, have played an
important role in the politics of the Caribbean, among other places, and some
historians attribute the abolition of slavery to this practice.28
But this is not just a particularity of voodoo black magic. Every observer
visible to her subject is an actor, but so is the person observed who becomes an
actor too. The notion of an action as part of an interplay between these two
agent-subjects strongly points to a necessary change in paradigm. The notion of
an action no longer fits the usual atomistic model, quite dear to moralists and legal
scholars. In this view, the simultaneity of interaction incorporates in each agent's
mindset that of the other agent and expresses how the meaning and consequences
of what we do is contingent upon other people's mental processes. I can only
suggest that the consequence of this logic is that the measure of control over our
24. See Rolf Breuer, Self-Reflexivity in Literature: The Example of Samuel Beckett's Novel Trilogy,
in The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We Know? Contributions to
Constructivism 145 (Paul Watzlawick ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1984); see generally, Paul Watzlawick et.
al., Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and
Paradoxes chs. 1, 2, 4 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1967).
25. See a synthesis approach in Laennec Hurbon, Los Misterios del Vudii (Claves no date).
26. See Paul Watzlawick, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, in The Invented Reality: How Do We Know
What We Believe We Know? Contributions to Constructivism 95 (Paul Watzlawick ed., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1984).
27. Id. at 106.
28. See a very brief version of this development in Hurbon, supra n. 25.
[Vol. 39:861
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss4/8
RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND LUCK
own reasoning and will limits our control over ourselves even further than Nagel
suggests. It thus seems that, if strict control is a necessary condition of
responsibility, we are left with practically no grounds open to reproach and
condemnation. Very little is left to reproach and condemn, as we understand
these terms, under PA. The question that arises is whether, genuinely concerned
about justice and fairness, we should give up blaming to the extent of what PA has
left us with.
III.
Since the 1980s, a number of governments throughout the world have
declared their responsibility for human rights violations perpetrated by previous
regimes. This has been the case with several Latin American and Eastern
European governments. The same trend has been followed by organizations and
civic groups for crimes perpetrated by individuals with whom these groups
identified themselves. The victims were members of other ethnic and religious
groups as well as political opponents from within and without the community of
the perpetrators. Swiss banks, for instance, formally expressed their contrition for
misappropriating gold entrusted to them by Jewish escapees to whom the Swiss
government denied political asylum during the Nazi era.29 In Argentina, Chile,
and South Africa, politicians and military leaders eventually acknowledged that
forces under their authority and command perpetrated crimes against certain
ethnic and religious groups and dissident segments. Similarly, in the United
States, several civil rights organizations have publicly expressed their regret for
the suffering of Native Americans and descendants of African slaves. Contrary to
this, the Turkish government has been repeatedly censored for its reluctance to
formally acknowledge the 1915 slaughter of Armenians.
I believe the significance of these admissions of responsibility, decades after
the wrongdoings, is not self-evident. Some acknowledgements and apologies are
quite perplexing. Take the case of remorse and guilt conveyed to descendants of
slaves more than a century and a half after abolition. In most cases, several
generations have passed and the direct agents (politicians, officials, and military
leaders) are now long retired, and many of them dead. This is indeed intriguing,
and I don't think looking at the direct victims and their descendants-nor at the
perpetrators and their progeny-will shed sufficient light on the meaning of these
acts. I don't believe the answer can be found by looking at either perpetrators and
their descendents or at the victims. What is most illuminating about institutional
apologies is understanding the uneven nature of the relations among agents and
victims that self-blame is addressed to remedy. This requires the vantage point of
political morality, a point of view that zeroes in on institutional relations and on
the kind of intra-community relations these institutions are designed to bring
about. In what follows, I draw upon the example of the African American
29. See Elazar Barkin, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices ch. 5
(W.W. Norton & Co. 2000).
2004]
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community and attempt to shed some light on the meaning of the admissions of
blame.
The comparatively dismal situation of African Americans today is well
known. By comparison to citizens of European descent in the U.S., members of
the former often have access to fewer opportunities for quality education and
employment. It has been noted in the past that one out of every four African
30Americans has been arrested. Furthermore, the material and status
disadvantages of this minority heavily impinge upon its members' self-respect and
self-esteem. Given this state of affairs, apologies from the more advantaged
segments-mostly those of European ancestry-makes sense. Acknowledgment
and apologies are means of allocating the blame on the person or group that issues
them. Like any adjudication of guilt for active wrongdoing, an apology sanctions a
single cause explanation for certain outcomes and states of affairs. 31 By single-
cause explanations, I intend to explain that blame simplifies reality.
Acknowledgment that you are guilty of what is happening to me implies that we
don't need any further explanation. We take blame to be a sufficient cause of
some outcome or state of affairs. This means we have turned the culpable
(responsible) agent into the cause of your predicament. Also, emotions you
experience, such as shame and vindictive resentment, are now largely explicable
and warranted. The cause of your plight is that I have wronged you. Insofar as we
accept this premise, you, the victim, are in no way responsible for this situation.
Blame entails a see-saw way we look at past events and what resulted from
them. You are in this situation today because of how my behavior played out, so
that you now suffer from great disadvantages.32 The way my projects have turned
out fashioned your fate. In terms of luck, the outcome luck of my action is now
your situational-and perhaps your constitutive-luck. To a great extent, the
relevant issue lies with the nature of the positive wrongdoing, not just with my
present failure to correct the effects of the wrongdoing. The combined reasons lie
in the harm done and the inequality you endure today. An explanation based on
the failure to correct ongoing injustices would beg the question of why apologize
to the descendents of slaves and not other disadvantaged minorities.3 3  It is
30. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 378 (Basic Bks. 1993).
31. I confine this statement to "positive" wrongdoing. Admissions of guilt for omissions are not
conclusive in this sense in that they allow enough room for other explanations. Pledging remorse for
failing to avert the harm you suffered does not preclude admission of important causes relevant to
understanding your plight. Thus, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's admission that the U.N. failed
to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 does not suggest that we are not to meaningfully inquire
about the nature of active wrongdoing by members of the Hutu majority. See Annan Expresses Regret
over Genocide, Chi. Trib. C10 (Mar. 28, 2004); Warren Hoge, Annan, at Rwanda Memorial Admits
U.N. Blame, 153 N.Y. Times A7 (Mar. 27, 2004).
32. Interestingly, this notion of disadvantage is narrowly related to what George Fletcher calls a
victim in his victim-centered justification of punishment: one who in some sense remains under the
domination of the perpetrator. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of
Retribution, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 51, 55-56 (1999) [hereinafter Fletcher, Place of Victims]. An
interested reader should also see George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought 79-93 (Oxford
U. Press 1996) [hereinafter Fletcher, Basic Concepts].
33. In fact, some authors believe the central claim African Americans have for rectification of the
enduring harms caused by slavery lies in the omission by modern generations to rectify past
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because the issue is not just one of present day inequalities. Indeed, overlooking
the issue of how the damage came about cannot answer the question of why
apologies should be addressed to the African American and not other
communities also suffering from injustice. If inequality were the central reason
for the present stance, one would perhaps ask why not apologize to the Central
Americans and their descendants. What explains the admission of guilt is the long
years of slavery and the enduring suffering and inequity the historic institution still
causes today. Yet for those who support the irrelevance thesis, there is a problem
with this conclusion.
Supporters of the irrelevance thesis resist the inclusion of the consequences
of luck as conditioning the moral assessment of our actions and practices.34 Our
own evaluation of the practice of slavery, this thesis stresses, cannot be altered by
outcomes that were not-and still are not-under the agent's control. The
irrelevance thesis would not make much sense if, for whatever reason, we were to
censure and condemn the wrongdoers for those consequences that happen beyond
their sphere of domination. Thus, it is worth noting that the present plight of
African Americans would be different today if slave ships, having lost their course,
ended up in India, or if the original victims of slavery fled once they landed in
America. Addressed at the slave descendents, we would be ill at ease to justify
self-condemnation for their predicament and not for other disadvantaged citizens.
Let me stress once more that (self-) condemnation is grounded in the practice of
chattel slavery, which led to the present inequalities. One can think of this process
by linking up past and present in terms of the different kinds of luck I earlier
mentioned.
The outcome luck of my forbears is now your situational luck; yours, as an
African American born in the 1970s or 1980s. This view, which originates in the
perspective of political morality, is also valid applied to actions and outcomes of
common, present day offenses. Given the single-cause explanatory nature of
moral condemnation, the declaration that I am to blame means that my guilt for
your plight renders other explanations superfluous. These explanations could
consist of every hint-psychological, biological, etc.-that could lead to
understanding your predicament. Insofar as we accept (self-) blame for the
outcomes, these explanations are now superfluous because my wrongdoing
accounts for your ill fate. Thus, apologies mean "dis-covering" that which
remained concealed in the official language. As George Fletcher has done 35 I
have elsewhere claimed that allocating blame places the victim and the
wrongdoing. For an excellent defense of this view, see Rahul Kumar & David Silver, The Legacy of
Injustice. Wronging the Future, Responsibility for the Past, in Justice in Time: Responding to Historical
Injustice 145 (Lukas Meyer ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2004).
34. It is important to notice that we find the irrelevance thesis interesting insofar as we also consider
that (1) luck ought not to modify our moral judgments, and (2) moral values should reign above all
other values. The irrelevance thesis would not make much sense if these conditions were not valid.
See Williams, supra n. 10.
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perpetrators on an equal footing.36 Trials of state criminals strongly suggest that,
unlike revenge, this process re-dignifies the victims, and this feature becomes
central to the justification of punishment.37
Single-cause accounts of outcomes such as court convictions and formal
declarations of regret play the political role of explaining states of affairs. Both
punishment and contrition elucidate why things are now the way they are. Athena
absolves Orestes of killing his mother because, in her view, the relevant account
does not begin with the death of Clytemnestra. Athena, as the judge, is mindful of
a story that commences when Helen leaves Menelaus or when Agamemnon
38sacrifices Iphigenia. We may better explicate the point from the opposite
perspective. Reactive attitudes such as blaming and condemning (a person or a
group) serves the pu-pose of freeing the community from blame, because blame
differentiates the responsible individual agent-or group-from the larger
community.39  Politicians may render their country responsible if they fail to
prosecute a pilot that shot down another country's aircraft. Blame taints, yet also
absolves. This is the reason, Feinberg points out, that, in sexist communities,
parents often compel their daughters to press rape charges against their male
companions. This procedure is apt to keep their young women clear from what
they view as staining sexual practices.n°
It is important to observe the way in which one agent's outcome luck
becomes another actor's constitutive and situational luck. We can only
understand Hecuba's behavior by bearing in mind that the man she blinds is the
treacherous killer of her child. The latter's death is Polymestor's luck, turned into
Hecuba's situational luck.41
IV.
I have attempted to explain the meaning of blame and condemnation from
the point of view of certain states of affairs that result from wrongful actions and
activities. This attempt should be valid for every condition generated by an
offense insofar as it engenders a victim who suffers from disadvantages generated
by criminal wrongdoing. Insofar as the practice of blame is concerned, a
proponent of the irrelevance thesis may claim that, in relation to the individual or
36. Jamie Malamud Goti, Equality, Punishment, and Self-Respect, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 497 (2002).
37. For a discussion of this topic in the field of state criminals, see Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral
Dilemmas about Trying Pinochet in Spain, in Justice in Time: Responding to Historical Injustice 299
(Lukas Meyer ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2004); and Christian Tomuschat, Comments on: Jaime
Malamud Goti, "The Moral Dilemmas of Trying Pinochet in Spain," in Justice in Time: Responding to
Historical Injustice 315 (Lukas Meyer ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2004).
38. For a similar interpretation, see Joseph Tussman, The Burden of Office: Agamemnon and Other
Losers 26-53 (Talonbooks 1989).
39. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and Deserving: Essays in
the Theory of Responsibility 95, 105 (Princeton U. Press 1970).
40. Id.
41. For an excellent account of Hecuba's luck, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness:
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 41-47, 413-15 (Cambridge U. Press 1986).
42. See Fletcher, Place of Victims, supra n. 32, at 51-52; see generally Fletcher, Basic Concepts, supra
n. 32; Malamud Goti, supra n. 36, at 497-508.
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the group condemned, this practice is unjust or irrational. I don't have much to
say to someone who raises the point based on a certain metaphysical conception
of our place in the world. Nor do I have an answer to the contention that we
haven't, thus far, provided definitive reasons for autonomy. This is the reason that
political morality becomes essential. It tells us how critical blame is and what it
means to our interpersonal dealings.
The question here is how we intend to live with others in a community in
which we celebrate the fact that people win prizes and awards for achievements
we attribute to their merits, and blame and condemn others for (intentionally)
causing harm to other individuals and groups, imposing risks and suffering upon
them. As one aspect of political and retributive justice, responsibility should be
anchored in the community because it is there that events take place, and not in
the vast world of philosophers and criminal law scholars. Justice is about
distributing benefits and burdens among members of different communities. As
such, we may sponsor abstract principles and values applicable to all. As far as
our concrete actions and institutions are concerned, principles and values vary
from place to place. The relevant community, in relation to burglary, may be our
city or our neighborhood. The whole world may be the community in relation to
Hitler's abuses.
Thus, I believe I have shown the impossibility of establishing a realistic
practice of blame based on PA, because it would lack the requisite support in
reality. Very little in our lives happens beyond luck. A realistic thesis on outcome
luck must therefore ground itself in some notions close to CSA. This may be the
reason that, in spite of reifying the will, Kant acknowledges the relevance of
outcomes of the actions that result from the exercise of this will.
43
It is on the basis of our political relationships I suggest that our expectations
about who we are, how we relate to one another, and how responsible we should
consider ourselves must be modest and even more limited. It is also from this
starting point that I propose a solution close to CSA if-and only if-as the social
situation demands we examine the outcomes of our actions. My main premises
are that it is a good thing that we acknowledge each other as autonomous
individuals, but, at the same time-and not without contradiction-that we
understand ourselves as acting under the power of the world of causes and effects.
We may be mental beings, but we also are like everything else that we can touch
and feel-including the existing copies of Rethinking Criminal Law-particles of
the natural universe.
43. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 19 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge U. Press 1991).
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